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BOOK REVIEWS
PRODUCTS LLI4rLrrY AND SAFErrY, CASES AND MATERIALS. By W. Page
Keeton, David G. Owen, and John E. Montgomery. Mineola, N.Y.:
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1980. Pp. xlv, 1033. $24.50.
Reviewed by Richard E. Speidel*
In the preface to this casebook, the authors assert that the
"time has come for products liability to assume its place as a full 3
hour course on [sic] the law school curriculum."' Why? Because
in the last fifteen years there has been a marked increase in products
liability litigation, a rapid evolution in the theory of liability and a
substantial growth in the quantity of government regulation. These
events have triggered what has been called a "products liability
crisis." Whatever phrase is attached, these events have revealed a
legal and social problem of genuine importance. Accepting these
developments as true, do they justify offering a course in products
liability and safety as an integral part of the modern law school
curriculum?
Conceding that the problem should not be ignored in law
school, the answer, in my judgment, turns upon the nature of the
course and the quality of the teaching materials. Clearly this course
is fated to be positioned somewhere in the second or third year of
law school. It should not be just another survey course whose pri-
mary objective is simply to integrate materials readily available for
study in other courses, such as torts, commercial law, remedies, trial
practice, or insurance. It must not be just another barren outpost
in the wasteland of the third year. Beyond confronting a problem
of significance, the course must also be justified because it is profes-
sionally relevant and educationally sound. The more clearly the
teacher ,and the teaching materials can identify the professional
roles involved and the intellectual and operational skills required to
perform them and to make explicit the educational methods em-
ployed to further learning, the better. More specifically, it is prefer-
able after the first year of law school to develop courses which focus
upon pervasive problems, relate them to a carefully planned curric-
ular structure and try fully to develop the different lawyerly roles
* Dean and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B., Denison Univer-
sity, 1954; LL.B., University of Cincinnati, 1957; LL.M., Northwestern University, 1958.
1. W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MoNrGoMERY, PRODUCTS LBImrY AND SAFETY, CASES AND
MATERALS XIX (1979) [hereinafter cited as W. KEETON].
2. See id. at ch. 10 (entitled "Crisis and Reform").
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and skills within the problem area. These roles and skills are as
varied and complex as the social problem under consideration. The
cardinal, deadly sin of legal education after the first year is the
seemingly endless repetition of survey courses where narrow analyti-
cal skills are repeatedly honed on a "casebook" in a fairly large class
where variety, close supervision, and "feedback" are at a minimum.
If you doubt this, simply look around. Without question, the survey
course, characterized by a medium- to large-sized class, use of a case
book, and a one shot examination, still dominates legal education.3
Products liability and safety is an important and pervasive problem
in a highly industrialized, market-oriented society. A course built
around this area could be an exciting event. How have Messrs.
Keeton, Owen and Montgomery packaged their product? Are these
materials professionally relevant enough and educationally sound
enough to justify a lasting place in the law school curriculum?
The authors' stated objectives in the casebook are to present a
logical framework built upon court doctrine on questions of liability,
to emphasize the policy choices that courts must make, and to
provide through detailed notes a mini-textbook within a casebook.4
Fully fifty-five percent of the 1024 pages consists of edited appellate
materials and another thirty percent consists of extended notes and
questions. The balance consists of text by the authors and excerpts
from the published work of others. There are few if any variations
in this unrelenting style. Case is piled upon case and note is stacked
upon note. There are no problems for solution5 and no deviations
from the major theme. This is, therefore, a highly traditional case-
book with a predominant focus upon the work of appellate courts
in adjudicating products liability cases.
The possibilities for a broader approach have not eluded the
authors. Chapter One starts by exposing the student to the incid-
ence and social costs of defective and dangerous products, and con-
cludes with a "case litigation study" of an especially dangerous
product (a circular saw), that illustrates the separate and overlap-
ping provinces of products liability and products safety law. The
authors, however, draw a sharp distinction between liability (litiga-
tion) and safety (regulation) and make it clear that the book will
emphasize the former rather than the latter. Thus federal and state
regulatory efforts to prevent accidents are treated interstitially
throughout a book otherwise devoted to questions of liability.,
3. This contributes, no doubt, to what Dean Roger C. Cramton calls "a bias deeply
engrained . . . that law school is a training ground for technicians who want to function
efficiently within the status quo." Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School
Classroom, 29 J. LEG. ED. 247, 262 (1978).
4. W. KEETON, supra note 1, at xix.
5. There is perhaps one exception. See id. at 576-77.
6. Without question, this interstitial treatment provides important information and
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Moreover, the time frame for the liability analysis is circumscribed
by what is termed the beginning of modern products liability
law-the 1916 decision of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 7 and cur-
rent efforts, both state and federal, to impose legislative restrictions
upon courts in the development of liability theory. The history be-
fore 1916 is given a light touch' and the possibility of future legisla-
tive compensation systems in this area, while noted, is not devel-
oped.'
Accepting this emphasis and constraint, the key question is
how the liability issues are developed in the balance of the book.
Chapter Two assumes that a manufacturer has manufactured and
sold defective goods which have injured a purchaser, user, or con-
sumer and traces the development of four possible theories of liabil-
ity-negligence, misrepresentation, warranty, and strict liability.
Each theory is given separate treatment and there are ample oppor-
tunities in the materials to contrast the various difficulties that bar
imposition of liability. The victor is, of course, strict liability, which
within its purview has overcome many of the traditional obstacles
to individual protection, such as the requirements of "privity,"
proof of negligence and timely notice, and the enforceability of con-
tractual disclaimers and of limitations on remedies. This excellent
development is capped by a separate section on the policy assump-
tions underlying strict liability. These materials will help the stu-
dent evaluate liability development and the possible extension of
strict liability to parties in the distributive chain other than the
manufacturer and to those who sell land or services rather than
goods. More importantly, the analysis facilitates a preliminary in-
quiry into the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial process in
developing and administering a regime of strict liability or a liabil-
ity theory that probes further into the realm of a products compen-
sation system.
On balance, this chapter is well done. In terms of pedagogy,
selected problems placing the students in a particular state and
requiring the development of liability theories in that setting would
drive home the point of overlap and choice. Each state has a differ-
ent pattern of development and students should realize that under-
perspective. For example, there are materials on the Consumer Product Safety Commission,
id. at 1-17, 250, 305-07; the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, id. at 116, 175-78; the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, id. at 290-93, 307-12, 346-59, 396-99; the Federal Hazardous
Substance Act, id. at 296-303; the Federal Aviation Administration, id. at 365-73; and the
Federal Flammable Fabrics Act, id. at 372-73. Although much of this material focuses upon
the impact of state and federal regulation in liability litigation, at least one section considers
the reliability of the government decision to regulate in the interest of safety. Id. at 481-91.
7. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
8. W. KEETON, supra note 1, at 19-26, 117-22.
9. Id. at 212-14.
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standing theories in the .abstract is no substitute for careful research
and advocacy within the state whose law applies.'" I wonder, how-
ever, whether it was wise to postpone until later in the book" the
question whether strict liability should be extended to other than
manufacturers or providers of services. Although the issue is close,
the student might profit at this point from wrestling with such
questions as whether the policy assumptions justify extension of
strict liability to, say, a non-negligent dentist who provides defec-
tive services or a non-negligent manufacturer who sells sound goods
that cause harm to an ultimate purchaser. In terms of substance,
an important mistake in this chapter is the failure to address the
range and variety of damage which can be caused by a defective
product. In the usual way, theories of liability are treated early and
the scope of remedial protection is postponed.'" This causes diffi-
culty when the authors in Chapter Two explore the extent to which
contractual arrangements can disclaim warranties or limit remedies
for breach.'3 It is one thing to discuss the effect of agreements limit-
ing liability, whether it be through disclaimers of warranty or excul-
pation of negligence, and another to discuss those limiting the reme-
dies available to aggrieved parties. It is easier to do the latter, espe-
cially where economic loss rather than damage to person or property
is involved." More importantly, the scope of the liability theories,
particularly strict liability, may be limited in nonprivity cases
where the loss is economic.'5 Without reploughing the tedious
ground around the proper scope of the Uniform Commercial Code
and strict liability,'6 the incongruity that the nature of the loss may
control the scope of liability forces another look at the theory itself.
Despite some very interesting materials, little effort is made to con-
front this problem or to integrate the four theories into a more
10. For example, Massachusetts has not adopted strict liability but the same result is
achieved by a warranty theory under a special version of U.C.C. § 2-318. See Swartz v.
General Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61 (Mass. 1978); Note, Massachusetts Strict Liability Law:
Alternate Route, Same Destination, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 237 (1978).
11. These problems are addressed in Chapters Six and Seven.
12. See W. KEarON, supra note 1, at ch. 9.
13. The discussion is limited to enforceability under the Uniform Commercial Code. Id.
at 150-73.
14. Whatever the considerations of efficiency and fairness in tort law, contractual ar-
rangements allocating various risks associated with product accidents do not occupy much
space or a very high priority in this book. Id. at 196-98. See also Speidel, An Essay on the
Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1975).
15. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1093 (1969).
16. There are, however, some diligent Ohio farmers. See Shanker, A Reexamination of
Prosser's Products Liability Crossword Game: The Strict or Stricter Liability of Commercial
Code Sales Warranty, 29 CASE WEs. REs. L. Rxv. 550 (1979).
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cohesive theme. 7
Chapter Three, some 280 pages in length, confronts in massive
detail the requirement that a product which causes damage be
defective before liability under any theory can be imposed. Defec-
tiveness is another way of asking whether an adequate level of safety
has been achieved for the particular product or marketing process
involved. In direct contractual relationships, this issue can be re-
solved by ascertaining the level of quality required by the contract,
aided by applicable express or implied warranties." Even without
a direct contract, consumers frequently rely upon express represen-
tations by remote sellers made through various modes of advertis-
ing." But in the absence of contract or express representations and
regardless of whether the theory of liability turns on negligence or
not, a retroactive examination of whether the product was
"defective" will occur after every accident. What are the tests?
The authors start by exploring two approaches to "defect"-the
"consumer expectation" test and the "risk-benefit" analysis. The
former aims at determining minimal levels of safety from the rea-
sonable expectations of consumers and the latter is directed more
to the aspirational question "can greater safety be achieved without
incurring costs deemed to be excessive?" Neither approach is en-
tirely satisfactory, and the authors conclude with an inquiry into an
alternative test for defectiveness that is premised less on defect and
more on the degree of danger created. With this groundwork laid,
they pursue the elusive tests for defect in several different set-
tings-(1) the manufacturing process, where the final product may
contain flawed components or may be improperly assembled; (2)
the marketing process, where the product is dangerous if not defec-
tive and the seller has failed to provide adequate warnings or direc-
tions for use; and (3) the design process, where the "how safe is safe"
question is asked as part of the "risk-benefit" analysis. These mate-
rials are well organized, exhaustive, and richly illustrated with
product varieties and competing tests for defect. Then follow sec-
tions on the extent to which assembly and design obligations can be
delegated by the manufacturer, fundamental limitations on the con-
cept of defectiveness (for example, the danger was "useful," the
product deteriorated, the danger was undiscoverable and unavoida-
ble, and the product met the state of the art), and the obligation of
17. W. KETON, supra note 1, at 222 n.3.
18. Id. at 102-45.
19. The core of this idea has been elevated into a pervasive theory of products liability.
See Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal
Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
1980]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the manufacturer to warn or recall after the product has been mar-
keted. The massive chapter concludes with a section entitled
"Perspectives on Defectiveness and Governmental Intervention"
which reconsiders risk-benefit analysis in the light of government
safety regulation and the role of the courts in light of the continuing
controversy over the proper test for design defects.
It is difficult to imagine a more thorough, well organized collec-
tion of materials on defectiveness. The chapter is a veritable gold
mine for the persistent miner, although the nuggets are not always
readily apparent. But is it teachable? Will anyone but the most
diligent have the persistence and patience to dig through it? The
answer, in my judgment, will be "no"; the difficulty will be compli-
cated by the absence of variations in approach or visible author
preferences. There is no time or opportunity to reflect or to "try
on" ideas in the unending barrage of cases, notes, and questions."0
The balance of the book, in my judgment, tells us in a very
traditional way more than we need to know about some well-
understood problems. Chapter Four treats defenses of the defendant
based upon the plaintiff's conduct, such as contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, product misuse, and comparative fault. Chapter
Five explores the requirement that the plaintiff establish that the
defective product caused the loss, with an important distinction
drawn between the necessity for causation in fact and the limita-
tions on liability inherent in the idea of "proximate" cause. The
causation requirement is closely tied to the plaintiff's general bur-
den of proof-a problem addressed in Chapter Eight. Chapters Six
and Seven treat two related areas involving the scope of liability:
the extent to which liability extends to other sellers of goods in the
distributive process (including idemnification); and the extent to
which commercial parties other than sellers of goods-for example,
providers of services and sellers of real property-are liable for
defective performance." Chapter Nine presents a survey of remedies
20. For example, § 104 of the proposed Uniform Products Liability Act defines defective
product exclusively in terms of whether it was "unreasonably unsafe" in construction, design,
or other aspects. The consumer expectation test is rejected in favor of a pervasive requirement
that risk be balanced against utility. Is this a sound approach? Or, as Professor Jeffry
O'Connell suggests, should the defect requirement be rejected for a test imposing liability "for
bodily injury to any human being resulting from the operation of typical risks associated with
the activity of the enterprise?" See O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance:
Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. Rav. 749 (1973). Key questions like these are frequently buried in
the detail.
21. In my judgment, Chapters Six and Seven on the scope of liability beyond the
manufacturer of goods should be condensed, integrated and combined functionally with
Chapter Two, "Theories of Manufacturer Liability." The current separation reduces the
potential of the excellent section on "Policy Issues Underlying Strict Liability," W. KFroN,
supra note 1, at 205, as a staging ground for testing the extension of liability.
[Vol. 33:813
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available to the plaintiff, emphasizing the problems of choice. The
casebook concludes with a chapter entitled "Crisis and Reform,"
which contains excerpts from articles on the "crisis" in products
liability and a copy of the proposed "Uniform Product Liability
Act," a model for state legislation which emerged from the United
States Department of Commerce Task Force on Product Liability
and Accident Compensation. It should be noted that the reforms
contemplated here do not encompass movement toward a legislative
compensation system for product accidents. Rather, they reflect
pressure to retreat from the full implications of the regime of strict
liability as unevenly administered by courts to the uniform and
balanced perspective of a statute under which the role of the courts
is controlled.
In this brief review, I have attempted to determine whether this
casebook makes the case for installing products liability and safety
as an integral part of the law school curriculum. Admittedly, defec-
tive products pose an important social and legal problem with which
lawyers are deeply involved. The question is, however, whether the
casebook is, within the broader framework of contemporary legal
education, both professionally relevant and educationally sound to
a sufficient degree. It is my grudging conclusion that, on this basis
at least, the case has not been made.Y The casebook is a period piece
which examines a relatively narrow slice of products liability life
through the microscope of the appellate court. Although that slice
has been exhaustively and skillfully prepared, it gives neither the
student nor the teacher a sense of the rich common-law past, the
challenges of the "compensation system" future or a full picture of
the complex roles played by contemporary lawyers both inside and
outside of the litigation process. The unrelenting collection of cases
and notes strongly suggests that the only skills worth cultivating in
this area are the analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of liability deci-
sions by the courts. When this occurs in any course after the first
year, the result, no matter how superb the organization and analy-
sis, is predictable. Even a musical director with the talent of Seiji
Ozawa would have trouble livening up this score.
The critical question is whether a book that stakes out such a
narrow compass can ever justify a claim that products liability has
arrived? Assuming, as the authors do, that the products liability
22. This conclusion is weakened by the fact that I have not had a chance to "teach"
the book. Also, the conclusion about this book may apply equally to most "casebooks,"
including those with which I am associated. The time has come, however, for a rigorous
reexamination of what passes for teaching and teaching materials in the law schools, with a
view toward broad based improvements.
1980]
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world began in 1916 with McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.," ended
in 1980 with the Uniform Products Liability Act, and featured lia-
bility in the courts, the claim is difficult if not impossible to justify.
How, then, could the claim be supported? I have no single prescrip-
tion. An obvious approach within that compass would be to cut the
size of the book and sharpen the focus through more analytical text
by the authors, fewer cases, and shorter notes. Also, the educational
terrain might be varied by problems and exercises which reflect the
different roles played by lawyers in the litigation process. Thus,
exercises where students are expected to predict results in subse-
quent cases, prepare the draft reform legislation, plan trial strategy,
or negotiate settlements could easily be devised. Additionally, prob-
lems in drafting complaints where alternate theories of liability
exist, in organizing class actions, in joining elusive drug manufac-
turers, and in insuring that all of those responsible in contribution
or for indemnification have been joined could be added. At a time
when law schools are being pressured to improve their skills train-
ing, specifically the preparation for trial advocacy," the challenge
of products liability litigation offers an unparalleled opportunity to
integrate intellectual and operational skills in a conventional
course. Changes of this sort would, in my judgment, improve the
teachability of this course and its relevance to a wider variety of
lawyer roles.
But is this enough? Recently, Dean Michael Kelly has argued
that the "scandal" of legal education is that the analytical exercises
in which we engage are more practical than intellectual and too
narrowly based to be much help in critical evaluation and problem
solving.2s If our objective is to develop attorneys who understand
and can critically evaluate the operating system and who are pre-
pared to learn while confronting the range of uncertainty that arises
over a lifetime of practice, much of the time invested in conven-
tional law school courses is either wasted or misplaced. A course in
products liability, if the sights were raised and the perspectives
broadened, might answer this fundamental objection.
23. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
24. See, e.g., ABA LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR SEC71ON: LAwYER
COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF TH LAW SCHOOLS 3 (1979):
Law schools should provide instruction in those fundamental skills critical to lawyer
competence. In addition to being able to analyze legal problems and do legal research,
a competent lawyer must be able effectively to write, communicate orally, gather facts,
interview, counsel, and negotiate . . . Law schools should also offer instruction in
litigation skills to all students desiring it.
25. Kelly, The Scandal of Legal Education, 1979, Report of the Dean of the University
of Maryland School of Law. See also McGowan, University Law School and Practical
Education, 65 A.B.A.J. 374 (1979); Allen, The Prospects of University Law Training, 29 J.
LEGAL ED. 127 (1978).
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This solution is complex and much of the work has not been
done. With the focal point upon either preventing accidents or as-
sessing responsibility for products which cause harm to people and
property, the first inquiry would be to determine what more could
be done with the history of products liability before the Escola26 case
in 1944. More is involved than tracing the evolution of doctrine in
the elaborate common law processY What can be learned from the
interaction of doctrinal evolution, economic development, and so-
cial concern for the injured consumer that precedes and helps to
explain strict liability? Was the Anglo-American experience differ-
ent from that in civil law countries? What was the influence of
products liability insurance for manufacturers and the paucity of
private plans outside of workman's compensation for injured
victims? What pressure was developed by an organized plaintiff's
bar with contingent fees in mind for a simpler and more direct
theory of liability?
Once the seed of strict products liability had been sown in
California, the next period for understanding and assessment is the
rapid growth of that plant over the next thirty years in a federal
system of government. The courts, as the initial seed planters, found
support in the egalitarian vibrations of the consumer protection
movement and the private lawmaking efforts of the American Law
Institute's Restatement (Second) of Torts. The restraint, if any, was
asserted by more traditional notions of contract and the Uniform
Commercial Code, which aimed primarily but not exclusively at
commercial warranties. The tension between these two sources of
law and the ultimate victory of strict liability over the "intricacies"
of the law of sales represents one of the more interesting legal devel-
opments in the last quarter century. Legal niceties aside, what
really explains an ineluctable development that transcended the
limitations of post-realist thinking, outflanked the efficiency trap of
microeconomic analysis, and emerged on a platform that was sup-
ported more by assumptions than reliable data on such questions
as the cost and effectiveness of insurance, the deterrent effect of
liability, and the adequacy of private insurance to absorb the first
shock of an accident? In the aftermath, with increasing legislative
pressure to restrict the scope of strict liability, one must be both
intrigued and concerned about how this private law development
with such a macro-impact could occur.
The retreat and increased control reflected by such proposed
26. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
27. A task done with distinction in E. Law, AN ImNODUcmoN To LEGAL REA SONING,
9-25 (1949).
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legislation as the Uniform Products Liability Act provides an ad-
dendum to the development of strict liability. Has reality caught up
with aspiration and do the actual costs of administering through
litigation an imperfect compensation system outweigh considera-
tions of fair compensation to injured consumers? At the same time,
this retreat may (and should) herald renewed interest and inquiry
into two closely related problems for the future: (1) the extent to
which a more efficient and fair compensation system for product
accidents can be developed through the legislative and administra-
tive processes; and (2) the extent to which more effective accident
prevention systems-systems concerned with more than simple
product failure-can be developed. Surely these questions tran-
scend in importance the current rattle in the courts and the litera-
ture over the legal standard for defect in design cases. For if any
engine mounting on a DC-10 or nuclear reactor system or chemical
storage container fails, the one-shot cost to life, property, psycholog-
ical well being, and economic relationships obliterates every as-
sumption made about strict liability as a compensation system and
makes accident prevention (safety) the most important considera-
tion for private industry and government regulators. Let's face it.
The common-law string in products cases barely holds its own
weight and is in danger of breaking. The future lies in surrounding
and perhaps supplanting this string with more vigorous accident
prevention and compensation systems. It surely is a challenge worth
tackling head on at an early stage in one's legal studies.2
LAw, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION. By Francis A. Allen. Ann Arbor,
Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1979. Pp. viii, 123. $12.00
cloth, $5.95 paper.
Reviewed by Gene R. Shreve*
This small book by a former dean of the University of Michigan
Law School is the most confident statement of the nature and pur-
pose of American legal education to appear since questioning and
serious criticism gathered force in the 1970s. Coming after a period
28. As this review is completed, another "casebook" on products liability by Professor
Marshall S. Shapo has been announced for publication in the spring of 1980. The liability
book will be accompanied by a separate paperback by Shapo entitled "Public Regulation of
Product Hazards."
* Associate Professor, Vermont Law School. A.B., University of Oklahoma, 1965; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1968; LL.M., Harvard University, 1975.
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of relative disillusionment, Law, Intellect, and Education is valua-
ble for some of the claims it makes in support of legal education.
While I find myself in disagreement with many of the author's
points, I think the book generally represents an important contribu-
tion to the literature on legal education' because it represents the
philosophical position of the powerful law school traditionalists,
who seldom reduce their views to writing.2 This forthright book says
more about the feelings which justify traditional law school pro-
cesses than the speculations of twenty critics, thereby providing
important new material for the continuing dialogue on law school
reform.
Over the past thirty years, Dean Allen has written numerous
essays on law and legal education which have been edited, revised,
and combined into this volume. The collection is intended to repre-
sent the values and observations of an influential figure in American
law school circles, and to honor Dean Allen's service to the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools.3 The book can most easily be seen
as a work on law schools, although the author prefers the broader
concept of "the university law school." 4
The author's insistence on viewing the law school as part of a
greater university community serves as a basis for some valuable
observations about trends and needs in legal education. Dean Allen
addresses the impact of other disciplines on law teaching and schol-
arship, noting that
1. For an overview of the considerable body of literature which has been produced on
the subject of legal education, see Barry & Connelly, Research on Law Students: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, 1978 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 751.
2. Id. See also Griswold, Legal Education 1878-1978, 64 A.B.A.J. 1051 (1978). Writings
critical of learning opportunities in law school have appeared in far greater number. E.g.,
Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1970 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACT. 71; Mohr &
Rodgers, Legal Education: Some Student Reflections, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403 (1973); Patton,
The Student, the Situation and Performance During the First Year of Law School, 21 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 10 (1968); Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965).
While perspectives of the authors differ, these works have in common a concern that greater
learning and growth in law school requires recognition of individual human needs and motiva-
tions of law students. This is sometimes described as the "humanistic" view of legal educa-
tion. One of the most forceful and extensively developed statements of the humanistic view
can be found in T. SHAm & R. REDMOUNT, LAwYERS, LAw STUDENTs AND PEOPLE (1977). See
also Shreve, Book Review, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 259 (1978) (reviewing T. SHAmTR & R. RED-
MOUNT, LAwYERs, LAw STUDENTs AND PEOPLE (1977)). In many respects this book provides an
interesting counterpoint to Law, Intellect, and Education.
3. The idea for the book came from those with whom Dean Allen served on the AALS
Executive Committee. F. ALLEN, LAw, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION vii (1979).
4. Id. at 65. The concept would seem to be particularly relevant in light of the current
controversy over the place of practical skills training in the law school curriculum. See notes
15 & 16 infra; McGowan, The University Law School and Practical Education, 65 A.B.A.J.
374 (1979).
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there are few competent and conscientious law teachers or scholars who today
would question the penetrating power of economic analysis in the considera-
tion of some legal questions, the utility of techniques of social research devel-
oped outside the law schools, or the insights gained from viewing contemporary
problems from the broad perspective of historical sequences. 5
At the same time, Dean Allen justly criticizes the frequent failure
of legal scholars to borrow and apply techniques of empirical re-
search to their own work! The need to develop strategies for collect-
ing and evaluating factual data is great. He writes that "in many
vital areas of legal policy. . . we literally do not know what we are
doing, and we are not sufficiently committed to finding out."' Sus-
picion of the methods of empirical research long accepted in other
academic disciplines has been a tradition among legal scholars' and
will die hard. This book will hasten its demise, particularly in light
of the reinforcement Dean Allen gives to law faculty members seek-
ing to broaden their interdisciplinary horizons.
Advanced degree work in the humanities or social sciences is
rarely a prerequisite for law school faculty appointment. Faculty
members who are drawn directly from law school or practice proba-
bly are often intimidated by both the knowledge and research meth-
odologies of related university fields. Yet Dean Allen writes of "the
remarkable task of self-education that law faculty members, partic-
ularly young ones, have undertaken in the past generation.", The
author performs a genuine service in encouraging law professors to
explore material from related university disciplines and integrate it
into their teaching and scholarship, although they may always lack
the certification of a doctoral or master's degree in other fields.
Dean Allen writes in the preface that all essays in Law, Intel-
lect, and Education express his concern that legal education "is
under attack in the twentieth-century world, and that, if it is to
survive, it must today, as in the past, be contended for."'" The
author undertakes to defend legal education from what he sees to
be the potentially corrosive effect of developments beyond the bor-
ders of the university community. The external threats cited by
Dean Allen change according to the time each essay was written.
They include "intellectual obscurantism" in the years immediately
5. F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 57.
6. Id. at 88.
7. Id. at 89.
8. For example, Thomas Reed Powell, a professor at Columbia University School of Law,
used to speak with disdain of some social studies where "counters don't think, and thinkers
don't count." H. FRiENDLY, FEDERAL JUmsSDIMON: A GENERAL VIaw 15 (1973).
9. F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 56. Dean Allen argues strongly for the need of legal
educators to educate themselves. Id. at 44.
10. Id. at vii.
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following the Second World War," Vietnam, " rapid technological
change, 3 Watergate,' and bar association attempts to shape law
school curriculums. 5
It is regrettable that Dean Allen has chosen to cast the purpose
of his collection of essays in such epic terms. While the book works
well at a musing, epigrammatic level," it is an inadequate vehicle
for the author's larger purpose of defending essential values of legal
education. Why and how the external forces identified by Dean
Allen threaten legal education is never fully explained. More basi-
cally, the book devotes little specific attention to what the processes
of American legal education are or should be. The reader needs a
clearer indication of the purposes and methods of student learning
and growth in law school in order to understand and evaluate posi-
tions taken by Dean Allen.
Nowhere is this weakness more apparent than in the author's
discussion of student based criticism of legal education. Dean Allen
sees the dissatisfaction of law students with the quality of their
classroom experiences as a "contribution of modern student atti-
tudes to the new anti-intellectualism in American legal educa-
tion."' 7 The substance of student criticism is never really pre-
sented, but the author appears to see in it a rejection of his vision
of an "intellectually based and humanistically motivated"" law
school. Dean Allen deplores the reluctance of some, perhaps many,
law students to undertake the intellectual exertion and self-
discipline for "clear and responsible thought"" in their legal stud-
ies. The author finds two sources for what he perceives as student
anti-intellectualism. The first is Vietnam disillusionment. Dean
11. Id. at 17 (note).
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id. at 40-41.
14. Id. at 11 (note).
15. Id. at 51-52.
16. For example, Dean Allen, referring to the practical skills controversy, states:
If ever the law schools and the practicing profession are in perfect accord, it will be
because one or the other has capitulated and abdicated its proper functions. In this sinful
world, when the lion and the lamb lie down together the lamb is usually in the interior
of the lion.
Id. at 57.
17. Id. at 71.
18. Id. at vii. Dean Allen uses variations of this phrase throughout the book. He appar-
ently sees law school learning as a fusion of the reasoning process (intellect) with the critical
study of values which have their source in other university disciplines (humanism). E.g., id.
at 24-25, 68. Dean Allen's repeated use of the term "humanistic"-"humanistically moti-
vated law training," id. at 62, "humanistic ends of law teaching," id. at 67, "humanistically
based legal education," id. at 69-may confuse readers who associate the term with a school
of thought more critical of legal education. See note 2 supra.
19. Id. at 68.
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Allen argues that students have less faith in, hence less interest in,
political and social institutions." The second source is what Dean
Allen calls the "hedonism of modern life."'" The author suggests
that learning in law school is hard work and inevitably painful, yet
many students feel that they "possess a kind of natural right not to
experience pain."' Dean Allen sees in student criticism a desire for
an easy, anti-intellectual classroom alternative. The author urges
law teachers to resist student pressures to make the tensions and
demands of the classroom less rigorous.23
Dean Allen's reports of the dissatisfaction of many students
with their law school experiences would seem accurate. Interest in
law school begins to decline during the first year,2 and the problem
worsens during the second and third years.2s Professors often become
discouraged at declines in class attendance or preparation and stu-
dent preoccupation with practice opportunities, either part time
during law school or full time thereafter. While this all may be true,
I think the author is wrong in concluding that student dissatis-
faction with the law school experience represents an unhealthy
trend in legal education. What can be observed during the decade
of the 1970s is an increasing willingness of students to react to long-
standing issues of relevance and quality in legal education. Students
have become far less willing to accept uncritically the character,
sequence, and duration of law school programs on the sole authority
of law school faculties and administrators.
20. Id. at 62. In Dean Allen's view, they are "impatient with any educational activity
that does not promise an immediate and discernable payoff in private law practice." Id.
21. Id. at 73.
22. Id.
23. He attempts to bolster flagging faculty spirits and adds notes both optimistic and
dire:
Resistance creates dissonance in their relations with some students, and dissonance is
particularly distressing to conscientious teachers who have always relied on a sympa-
thetic bond with their students as an avenue of communication and as a means for
mutual learning. Happily, there are indications that the dissonance is lessening. In any
event, the only alternative available to the instructor is default and capitulation.
Id. at 74-75.
24. See Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education: An In-Depth Examination of Career-
Relevant Interests, Attitudes and Personality Traits Among First-Year Students, 1979 AM.
B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 791, 838-39.
25. The behavior of many second and third year law students is characterized by
"cycles of extended periods of lethargy followed by bouts of cramming. During the second
and third years of study, student effort declines and disbelief in the value of the standard
techniques of legal education increases." TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTON OF LEGAL EDucA-
TION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LAwYEF CoMgraNcY: TnE ROLE OF LAw SCHOOLS 17 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as LAwYER COMPeTeCY]. For a thoughtful and detailed examination of
the problem of declining student interest in law school, see Stevens, Law Schools and Law
Students, 59 VA. L. REv. 551, 652-59 (1973).
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Traditional law school authority figures are losing their hold on
students for many reasons. Vietnam and Watergate have played
their part. Students are still aware that their knowledge of institu-
tional and professional models is inferior to that of their professors,
but because the models are less sacred, students are less intimi-
dated by their lack of knowledge and less willing to suppress or
postpone" criticism of their surroundings. The admission of larger
numbers of women to law schools is also a factor. Legal education
is no longer the male ritual or rite of passage that it used to be.
On one basic and important point I believe I am in agreement
with Dean Allen. When students reject the structure and content of
law school experiences offered them, their opportunities for learning
are greatly diminished. Law students simply lack the capacity to
design and implement an alternative program of learning entirely
on their own. I am as disturbed as I perceive the author to be that
not enough learning is happening in law school. The essence of my
disagreement with the author involves two related assumptions
which are at the core of the book. First, I am not persuaded that
student criticism of legal education is essentially irrelevant or that
it has its stimulus in larger and essentially unproductive trends of
hedonism or social disillusionment. Second, I cannot accept Dean
Allen's positive and essentially protective assessment of the suffi-
ciency of learning opportunities in law school.1
7
Learning in law school comes as a result of the totality of stu-
dent experiences in the law school community-what has been
called the law school "climate.'"" It is nonetheless fair to say that
most learning comes about as a result of the efforts of law teachers.
Unlike academic functions of scholarship and administrative contri-
bution, law teaching exists and can be evaluated almost exclusively
in terms of the quantity and quality of student learning. 9
The essential preoccupation of the book with analytic learning
as the purpose of legal education" can be faulted. While there is
26. It may be significant that the willingness of law graduates to look back critically
on the law school experience substantially predates student based criticism. See, e.g., Can-
trail, Law Schools and the Layman: Is Legal Education Doing Its Job?, 38 A.B.A.J. 907
(1952); Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947).
27. E.g., F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 57 ("Our mission, as it has been for the past eight
hundred years in the universities of the Western world, is the study of law and the institutions
of the law.").
28. T. SHAFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 2, at 193.
29. It seems to me that the most reliable measure of learning in law school is the extent
to which it influences or shapes the professional behavior of students who go into law fields
as lawyers, legislators, judges, and law teachers. One might begin with the qualities one hopes
to find in such professionals and relate these qualities back to the learning experiences of law
school.
30. See notes 19 and 27 supra.
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perhaps unanimous agreement that analytic learning is an essential
goal, one may ask whether systematic examination, integration and
growth of nonanalytic skills (such as writing, interviewing, and ne-
gotiating abilities) should not also be primary goals sought in legal
education.3 ' Yet even if the purpose of legal education could be
confined to analytic learning, the book fails to indicate what good
teaching in realization of that goal might be, or whether, or to what
extent law teachers are accountable if students fail to progress in
analytic learning.3 A consideration of the nature of and essential
preconditions for analytic learning makes it more difficult to accept
Dean Allen's dismissal of student dissatisfaction with their class-
room experiences.
It may be helpful at this point to offer some observations on the
nature of analytic learning and related strategies of casebook teach-
ing. Common to all roles in the law is the need for analytical compe-
tence in legal problem solving. Needed is the capacity both to ex-
plain and influence the legal processes by which controversies are
resolved, and by which the lives of members of our society are au-
thoritatively arranged. This can be done only through the utiliza-
tion of three highly integrated functions. First, educated lawyers
have knowledge of particular legal rules. Second, these rules are
matched against the facts of the particular situation derived from
observation. Finally, decisions are made about the possible legal
significance of the facts through the process of reasoning.
"Knowledge" can be knowledge about rules reflecting social
values (substantive law) or knowledge about the rules which com-
pose the process making social values authoritative (procedural
law). The selective packaging and distribution of knowledge is a
31. LAWYER CoMPETENcY, supra note 25, at 3. Neglect of nonadversarial skills associated
with client counseling is particularly distressing. Shaffer, Lawyers, Counselors, and Counsel-
ors at Law, 61 A.B.A.J. 854 (1975).
32. Dean Allen's references to the nature of law teaching are obscure. Of great teaching
he says simply: "One who has had the good fortune to study at the feet of great teachers whose
careers have been given over to the life of the mind will know that he has undergone a
profound ethical experience." F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 85. This tells us what makes teaching
successful or even great only if we make two assumptions in evaluating law teaching which I
believe represent the traditional view. First, the greatest (perhaps only) requirement for law
teaching is that the professor be knowledgeable and brilliant; "[1]aw teachers have as their
special pride and exaltation a conceptualistic brilliance that boggles the mind. The teacher's
intellect serves the power of the law, and that is what learning the law is made to seem all
about." T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 2, at 11. Best evidence of such prowess is
more likely to come through the professor's scholarly contributions than through his students'
classroom evaluations. Second, if a law student fails to learn from such a professor, he or
she-not the professor-is responsible. Quoting the late Professor Lon Fuller, Dean Allen
writes "through the subtle pressure [the student] exerts on his instructors to teach him what
he thinks he ought to be taught, he exerts an influence on legal education." F. ALLEN, supra
note 3, at 71 (quoting L. FuumL, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF 14-15 (1940)).
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central law school function. Students learn some of the knowledge
they will need through legal problem solving and they learn research
skills sufficient to acquire the remainder. If this were the only learn-
ing goal in law school, teaching materials would be black letter
texts. Instead, students most frequently use casebooks, which are
certainly inefficient vehicles for the transmittal of knowledge. Stu-
dents must extrapolate and apply knowledge (the rules) from the
cases. This forces them to deal with and develop skills of observa-
tion and reasoning in order to acquire knowledge and to associate
the three in the exercise of critical skills of analysis in legal problem
solving.
Analytic learning is most frequently associated with casebooks
and case method teaching. The presence of an analytic learning
component, however, is probably a sine qua non for the adoption of
any course into the law school curriculum. Such analytic learning
involves the student in the sacred process of learning to "think like
a lawyer." Venerated are "skills and values. . . of reading, writing,
reasoning, a strong repugnance to the abuse of rhetoric, and a dedi-
cation to the arts of reasoned articulation. ' '13
Two things are required of law teachers in order to facilitate
growth in analytic learning among their students. First, the profes-
sor must possess requisite knowledge of the field covered by the
course. Second, the professor must be able to engage and involve his
or her class in the process of learning. Knowledge of the field is, of
course, essential. The teacher must be capable of arranging, pres-
enting, and, as appropriate, clarifying casebook or other course ma-
terial. The teacher must be sufficiently well informed and thought-
ful about the material that he or she can, when appropriate, serve
as a model for the kind of critical thinking desired in the course. But
however thoughtful and authoritative the teacher's grasp of the
material may be, mere presentation of that expertise to students
will not greatly advance analytic learning. Students cannot develop
skills of observation and reasoning and relate them to the acquisi-
tion of knowledge if they are passive in class. The need of the
teacher to provide opportunities for student participation and to
develop strategies for drawing students from a passive to an active
learning state is the central issue in law school teaching. A student
cannot learn without strong individual involvement. In the ideal
classroom, the student has read the assigned material and come to
certain tentative critical judgements about it when the class starts.
He or she then listens carefully to the critical judgments of class-
33. F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 25.
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mates and the professor; speaks out to probe, criticize, or defend
issues which emerge; and, by the end of the class, revises or expands
his or her judgment if the experience of the class has persuaded him
or her to do so. The process of testing and revision of critical com-
mitments continues until the end of the course.
Dean Allen is correct in concluding that the process of analytic
learning34 is painful. Learning involves discovering and growing
from one's mistakes; that is emotionally uncomfortable and at times
degrading, even under the best of circumstances. 5 But to suggest
that students have no choice but to bear uncritically the pain of
learning 6 ignores sound learning theory. 7 The suggestion also ig-
nores the facts of modem student life. Students can no longer be
forced to accept approaches to teaching of which they disapprove.
Since most Fs are now given out through the admissions process,
grades are no longer the threat they probably once were. Moreover,
few law school professors presently try to bring about student partic-
ipation in class through force or intimidation. 8 Sadly, most law
school classes are taught primarily in a mode which involves and
engages students not at all-lecture.39 It is small wonder that
students are often bored and dissatisfied with law school teaching.,
34. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
35. Naturally, the impact of law school experiences will vary with individual students.
Hedegard, supra note 24, at 838. Most, however, find it a trying experience. See, e.g., Note,
Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1201.
36. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. Dean Allen comes close to romanticising
painful elements in the process of learning. He quotes Samuel Johnson on learning Latin:
"My master whipped me very well. Without that, Sir, I should have done nothing." F. ALLEN,
supra note 3, at 74 (quoting J. WAiN, SAMUEL JOHNSON 24 (1974)). Quoting Ivan Illich, he
writes "Man's consciously lived fragility, individuality, and relatedness make the experience
of pain, sickness, and even death an integral part of his life." Id. at 78 n.27 (quoting I. ILUCH,
TOWARD A HISTORY OF NEEDS 109 (1978)). Dean Allen disavows the more sado-masochistic
implications of this line of thought. Id. at 68. He argues, however, that profound learning
requires a pressure-charged environment. Id. at 73-74. Finally, he suggests that professors
must steel themselves against inevitable indications of student distress if they are "to serve
their important function" in legal education. Id. at 74; see note 23 supra.
37. Contrary to Dean Allen's conception of the intrepid student who makes his or her
own educational experience, see note 32 supra, his attitudes on pain and learning (which came
as close to anything in the book to learning theory) create a kind of approach to teaching
where student feeling and involvement in the learning processes is most likely to be excluded.
For reasons I shall state, this approach seems to me to be incomplete and unsound.
38. T. SHAFFR & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 2, at 9.
39. "[S]ixty to ninety percent of a typical large law class (and most are large) is
lecture." Id. Primary utilization of lecture in law school teaching is widely, if not universally,
deplored. See, e.g., Strong, The Pedagogic Training of Law Faculty, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 226
(1973). Professors who feel guilt about the amount of lecturing time do try to mask their work
with "questions and answers as mileposts in what is essentially a lecture." T. SHAFFR & R.
REDMOUNT, supra note 2, at 176.
40. It is encouraging that a recent, broadly based study on American legal education has
addressed improvement in the quality of teaching. LAwYER ComirFNcy, supra note 25, at 4.
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Learning and growth are painful processes for law teachers
too," and I am afraid that Dean Allen's book will encourage profes-
sors to rationalize important issues of their own individual growth
and to blame students for the pain they feel when aspects of their
teaching appear to fail. Erection or reinforcement of attitude bar-
riers between teacher and student will deprive most law teachers of
any real opportunity to advance learning.
Except in the classes of an occasional Professor Kingsfield, 1 a
working respect between teacher and students is essential for stu-
dent participation. The teacher's function of dispersing informa-
tion, or knowledge, seems to carry with it the highest degree of
acceptance and approval. Particularly after the first year, it often
becomes more difficult to get students to accept a teaching strategy
based on student discussion. Students seem to feel that their powers
of observation and reasoning have been fully developed and that
they simply need knowledge which will be useful in passing the bar
and practicing law. Under these circumstances the teacher may
surrender and lecture (more common is the lecture punctuated by
a few questions)." For the professor to overcome this problem of
student attitude it is necessary for the professor to achieve accept-
ance for demands made to take students out of their passivity. This
acceptance is most likely to come if students feel they can take the
psychological risks of classroom interaction. If the teacher, by exam-
ple and direction, establishes an atmosphere where the more inti-
mate aspects of the students' personalities-their feelings, values,
and commitments about the learning materials-will be respected,
then free discussion important to the development of analytic learn-
ing will occur." The problems are how to maintain this atmosphere
while also maintaining a level of correctness or analytic probity
about the material which the teacher feels is warranted, and how
to maintain this atmosphere while also covering the particular
There is still too great a tendency, however, to associate improvements in the quality of
teaching with alternatives to the case method. Id. at 26. Because alternatives (variously
termed problem method, simulation or clinical education) carry financial and other limita-
tions, it is unlikely that case method teaching will ever be replaced on a wide scale. See
Shreve, Classroom Litigation in the First Semester of Law School-An Approach to Teaching
Legal Method at Harvard, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 95, 104-05 (1977); LAWYER COMPMrENCY, supra
note 25, at 22. As a basic matter, effective learning is more a matter of teaching attitude than
pedagogical engineering.
41. See Redmount, A Clinical View of Law Teaching, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 705, 717 (1975).
42. Kingsfield was a tyrannical law professor in John Osborn's The Paper Chase, a
fictionalized narrative of student life at Harvard Law School. Kingsfields, however, are a
dying breed. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. Shreve, supra note 2, at 267.
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agenda of topics and ideas which the teacher feels is important.
Failure in the realization of these latter objectives will dissatisfy the
teacher and many of the students as well.
Solutions to these problems come with difficulty and only
through trial and error. 5 Student criticisms are inevitable and will
often be insensitive and unduly harsh, for few students seem to
realize their teachers are also undergoing a painful learning process.
Yet, if one wishes to view legal education in Dean Allen's epic terms,
these issues may actually represent "the greatest challenge facing
American law schools."" We cannot afford to wait, perhaps forever,
for the occurrence of favorable events outside the law school which
will somehow increase student enthusiasm for learning. Dean Allen
is right to urge renewed commitment to legal education, but it is the
enthusiasm, involvement, and learning of law students that must
"be contended for"47 by law teachers.
How will improvements come about? Dean Allen has provided
the answer in another context. The admirable capacity of many law
professors to assimilate knowledge from other disciplines related to
their fields of interest, what Dean Allen describes as "self-
education,"" has significance for educational reform. Most law pro-
fessors begin their teaching careers at least as ignorant of learning
theory as they do of history, sociology, or economics. They can use
the same capacity for self-education truly to become teachers.
Part of this self-education can come from consulting the wealth
of findings and theories on learning in general" and learning as a
law school phenomenon." But for self-education to be a sufficiently
congruent experience to provide real growth, each law teacher must
address the particular strengths and needs of his or her own person-
45. Naturally, solutions will differ. Law teachers cannot be required to teach the same
way or toward the same specific goals. What should be required is an informed and thoughtful
agenda for growth in teaching. Self-examination is particularly warranted for those using the
case method. Each teacher should think through the inevitable balances which must be
struck in casebook teaching-for example, structure and control versus spontaneity; covering
a great deal of ground versus covering a smaller amount in greater depth. Each teacher's
standards must exceed his teaching product. Functions of course material selection, the
planning and conducting of classes, and the preparation of examinations should be performed
subject to a series of goals worked out by the teacher with sufficient thought and self-
awareness that they can be articulated to others. These goals should themselves be subject
to periodic revision by the teacher.
46. F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 75.
47. Id. at vii.
48. Id. at 56.
49. For a review of the contributions of several important learning theorists which
relates their work to law school processes, see T. SHuM & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 2, at
28-33.
50. See note 1 supra.
1980] BOOK REVIEWS 833
ality and working environment. Law student reactions provide im-
portant information for teacher self-evaluation. If, as Dean Allen
suggests, the present era of unparalleled student candor about ef-
fects felt from the law school experience may be passing, we must
utilize this considerable source of data while we can.

